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Abstract 
An epidemiologist calculating the risk of a localised epidemic becoming a global pandemic would 
investigate every possible channel of contagion from the infected region to the rest of the world. 
Focusing on, say, the incidence of close human contact would underestimate the pandemic risk 
if the disease could also spread through the air. Likewise, calculating the quantity of financial 
system risk requires practitioners to understand all of the channels through which small and local 
shocks can become big and global. Much of the empirical finance literature has focused only on 
“direct” contagion arising from firms’ contractual obligations. Direct contagion occurs if one firm’s 
default on its contractual obligations triggers distress (such as illiquidity or insolvency) at a 
counterparty firm. But contractual obligations are not the only means by which financial distress 
can spread, just as close human contact is not the only way that many infectious diseases are 
transmitted. Focusing only on direct contagion underestimates the risk of financial crisis given 
that other important channels exist. This paper represents an attempt to move systemic risk 
analysis closer to the holism of epidemiology. In doing so, we begin by identifying the fundamental 
channels of indirect contagion, which manifest even in the absence of direct contractual links. The 
first is the market price channel, in which scarce funding liquidity and low market liquidity reinforce 
each other, generating a vicious spiral. The second is information spillovers, in which bad news 
can adversely affect a broad range of financial firms and markets. Indirect contagion spreads 
market failure through these two channels. In the case of illiquidity spirals, firms do not internalise 
the negative externality of holding low levels of funding liquidity or of fire-selling assets into a thin  
 
  
 
 
 
market. Lack of information and information asymmetries can cause markets to unravel, even 
following a relatively small piece of bad news. In both cases, market players act in ways that are 
privately optimal but socially harmful. The spreading of market failure by indirect contagion 
motivates policy intervention. Substantial progress has been made in legislating for policies that 
will improve systemic resilience to indirect contagion. But more tools might be needed to achieve 
a fully effective and efficient macroprudential policy framework. This paper aims to frame a high-
level policy discussion on three policy tools that could be effective and efficient in ensuring 
systemic resilience to indirect contagion – namely macroprudential liquidity regulation; restrictions 
on margins and haircuts; and information disclosure. 
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Section 1: Indirect contagion: the theory1
Why did US sub-prime credit, which totalled $1tn in 2007, trigger global financial 
crisis – while the dot-com equity market crash, which destroyed $8tn of wealth in 
2000, did not?
The scope for direct contagion, whereby counterparties fail to honour contractual 
obligations, was greater during the dot-com crash. The key ingredient in 2007 was 
indirect contagion, which occurs when firms’ actions generate externalities that
affect other firms through non-contractual channels. 
Sub-prime losses triggered indirect contagion; the dot-com crash did not. Losses on 
sub-prime credit instruments over 2007-08 were primarily borne by highly leveraged 
financial intermediaries with substantial liquidity mismatch, as Bernanke (2012) 
highlights. Initial losses prompted these intermediaries to delever by selling assets –
reducing their value and creating a fire sale externality. Uncertainty about the 
distribution of exposures drove a general risk retrenchment, causing short-term 
funding markets to evaporate. These channels were not triggered by the dot-com
crash: losses were primarily borne by unlevered households with no liquidity 
mismatch and a low marginal propensity to consume.
The comparison of the dot-com crash with the sub-prime crisis illustrates a general 
insight, which is the motivation for this paper. The insight is that indirect contagion is 
the key ingredient through which small and local initial shocks become big, global 
and systemic. Microprudential regulation can help to mitigate indirect contagion by 
increasing the resilience of individual financial institutions. Macroprudential 
regulation should also be designed and calibrated with a view to mitigating the 
scope for indirect contagion to spread market failures.
Much of the empirical finance literature has focused only on “direct” contagion 
arising from firms’ contractual obligations. Researchers’ simulations using actual 
interbank loan data suggest that “domino defaults” arising from contractual 
violations are highly unlikely,2 though they can be destructive in the event that they 
do materialise.3 By contrast, models incorporating indirect channels of contagion are 
able to explain a distinct class of systemic crises that can occur even in the absence 
of contractual linkages.4 Evidence suggests that losses owing to indirect contagion
during systemic crises dwarf direct losses.5 So it is not surprising that studies 
1 This section was written by the authors, with substantial contributions from Silvia Gabrieli and Guillaume Vuillemey.
2 Representative papers in this literature are Furfine (2003) for the US; Elsinger et al (2006) for Austria; Upper and Worms 
(2004) for Germany; Mistrulli (2007) for Italy; Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium; and van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) 
for the Netherlands. Alves et al (2013) study contagion within a network of large EU banks, and is therefore one of the few 
cross-country analyses available. Upper (2011) surveys and critically assesses the direct contagion literature.
3 Gai and Kapadia (2010) elucidate this common feature of financial (and more generally complex) systems: that they tend to
be generally robust, but fragile to targeted attacks on specific (systemically important) nodes.
4 Luck and Schempp (2015) develop a model in which an idiosyncratic run can lead to a systemic run by inducing an overall 
scarcity of liquid funds via the fire sale channel – even in the absence of direct contractual linkages. Anand, Gauthier and 
Souissi (2015) develop a model-based stress-testing framework that integrates fundamental solvency risk with funding liquidity 
risk and information asymmetries.
5 In an application of the Greenwood, Landier and Thesmar (2015) “vulnerable banks” framework to EBA stress test data, 
Lopez (2015) shows that the second-round effects owing to fire sale externalities tend to be greater in magnitude than an initial 
shock by a factor of approximately five.
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focusing only on direct contagion channels purport a much lower likelihood of 
distress than is suggested by a simple count of historical crises.
Direct financial contagion occurs when firms are connected by contractual 
obligations, and one or more counterparty no longer honours those obligations 
following a shock of some kind. Figure 1 provides a stylised illustration of such direct 
contagion, showing the impact of firm A’s exogenous default on firm B’s balance 
sheet.
By contrast, indirect financial contagion does not require any initial contract 
violation. Rather, indirect contagion occurs when firms’ actions generate 
externalities which affect other firms through non-contractual channels. We 
distinguish two main families of such channels:
A. Market-price channels: liquidation of balance sheets affects financial asset
prices, affecting all actors exposed to such assets. Such liquidations may
also give rise to liquidity problems, as the fall in value of collateral may trigger
margin calls.
B. Information channels: bad news, or rumours, may trigger hedging behaviour
by direct and indirect counterparties to the distressed firm.
These indirect channels of contagion are the outcome of significant endogeneity.
They often operate simultaneously, interacting with each other with potentially 
nonlinear effects. These indirect channels are likely to interact with the direct 
contagion channel, too, leading to systemic outcomes that are more severe than if 
only one contagion channel had been operational.
Figure 1: Direct contagion channels: Firm A defaults on obligations to firm B
Source: ESRB. Note: this stylised illustration assumes a loss given default rate of 100%.
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Part A: Market-price channels
Financial firms’ fortunes are connected when they hold common or correlated 
assets. One firm’s decision to sell can reduce the asset’s market price. This price 
reduction would affect the market value of assets held by all firms that did not sell. 
Since liabilities are fixed, a reduction in a firm’s market value of assets moves that 
firm closer to its point of default.6
This indirect channel of contagion is typically called a “fire sale externality”.7 The 
externality arises as one firm’s decision to sell the commonly held or correlated 
asset affects the probability of another firm defaulting. The selling firm does not 
internalise this effect, and so the outcome is likely to be socially inefficient.
The effect of the fire sale externality is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the mark-
to-market balance sheets of two firms, A and B, before and after firm A decides to 
sell a commonly held illiquid asset. In this stylised example, the price movement 
following firm A’s fire sale is so large that firm B becomes insolvent, as its assets are 
worth less than its liabilities. An analogous effect occurs when firm A decides to 
reduce new lending to a particular sector or region: this credit contraction will reduce 
the market value of firm B’s existing claims on that sector or region.
The situation before the fire sale can be thought of in terms of a strategic game. If 
firms coordinate, they are all better off. But if some firms stop coordinating, all other 
firms suffer a loss; at the extreme, the drop in the mark-to-market value of their 
assets (owing to the fire sale) may render them insolvent. In practice, the “co-
ordination” equilibrium may be difficult to sustain, since there are many financial 
firms (rendering co-ordination costly), and the costs of breaking any co-ordination 
agreement (in terms of smaller balance sheet size) are small relative to the costs of 
being left with the fire-sold asset (in terms of mark-to-market losses and potential 
insolvency).
A firm’s decision to fire-sell assets may be a discretionary choice or imposed by 
exogenous shocks. Adrian and Shin (2010) find that both commercial and 
investment banks target a specific leverage ratio. In the case of investment banks, 
this target leverage ratio tends to be pro-cyclical; commercial banks tend to target a 
constant (acyclical) leverage ratio. In both cases, an increase in a bank’s leverage 
relative to its target can prompt fire sales in order to reduce balance sheet size 
relative to equity. Greenwood, Landier and Thesmar (2015) show how such fire 
sales can affect other financial firms holding assets correlated with the fire-sold 
asset, following the basic mechanism illustrated in Figure 2. Fire sales can also be a 
necessary response to binding liquidity constraints: if a firm has a shortfall of cash 
relative to short-term liabilities, it might be forced to sell illiquid assets in a fire sale in 
order to generate more cash.
6 Another way of measuring the propagation of a market shock is through “excess price co-movements”, i.e. price movements 
in excess of those which can be explained by fundamentals, with prices being alternatively stock market returns, interest rates,
or exchange rates (Forbes and Rigobon, 2000). This contagion literature focuses on the transmission of shocks across 
countries; in this paper, we concentrate on the propagation of shocks across financial institutions.
7 For a selective review of some of the research on fire sales, focussing on both concepts and supporting evidence, see 
Shleifer and Vishny (2011).
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Market illiquidity worsens the fire sale externality. If a market were very liquid, one 
firm’s decision to sell would have a small impact relative to the total volume of buy 
and sell orders, and so the market price would be insensitive to this decision. By 
contrast, if one firm’s sell order is large relative to total market turnover, that sell 
order will trigger a price movement in excess of that which can be explained by 
fundamental asset value. The price movement is most severe for “crowded” trades 
in which many traders wish to sell simultaneously into an illiquid market.
Fire sales are most likely to occur during financial crises because market liquidity 
tends to be pro-cyclical: it is high when asset prices are rising during economic 
booms, and low when prices are falling during recessions (Figure 3). As such, the 
fire sale externality is likely to be potent precisely when firms are more prone to sell, 
Figure 2: Stylised illustration of the fire sale externality in operation
Source: ESRB.
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at the trough of the business cycle.
Moreover, there is some evidence that 
correlation across asset classes
increases during crises.8 Fire sale 
externalities have broader implications 
when cross-asset correlations are high, 
since the fire sale reduces prices across 
a broader set of asset classes.
Empirical analysis shows that fire sale 
externalities can be sizable. Duarte and 
Eisenbach (2015) empirically implement 
the framework proposed by Greenwood,
Landier and Thesmar (2015) using 
regulatory balance sheet data for US 
commercial banks and repo market data 
for broker-dealers. They construct a new 
measure of “aggregate vulnerability” to fire sale spillovers: their results show that a
1% exogenous shock to assets can produce sizable fire sale externalities as a 
percentage of system capital, and that fire sale externalities were between two and
three times larger during the 2007-08 financial crisis.
Fire sale externalities interact dynamically with balance sheet vulnerabilities –
potentially creating an adverse feedback loop of illiquidity. A key balance sheet 
vulnerability is liquidity mismatch, which is a structural feature of many financial 
firms’ business models, particularly banks and certain mutual funds.
Liquidity-constrained firms typically borrow cash, sometimes unsecured, but often
secured against a liquid security in a sale and repurchase (“repo”) transaction. In a
repo, the amount of cash which is borrowed is almost always less than the face 
value of the security which is pledged. This haircut relative to face value is a 
function of the perceived riskiness of the security. Risk is higher if the underlying 
security is being fire-sold because the fire sale reduces the market value of the 
asset, thus prompting the repo counterparty to impose a higher haircut, or even to 
forestall new repos altogether.
Repo counterparties’ behavioural response to an increase in market illiquidity 
reduces aggregate funding liquidity in the financial system. As liquidity-constrained 
firms start selling their more liquid assets, their balance sheet becomes more and 
more illiquid. As a result, they have a higher tendency to sell illiquid assets at a large 
discount. This creates the conditions for a system-wide illiquidity spiral: market 
liquidity and funding liquidity negatively interact with each other and coincidentally 
deteriorate. The stylised dynamics of this illiquidity spiral are illustrated in Figure 4.
8 For example, Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Chen (2002), Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) and Corsetti, Pericoli and 
Sbracia (2005) find evidence that cross-asset correlation increases when returns are negative. However, evidence is mixed: 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) attribute higher correlation during negative-return periods to the procyclicality of market volatility 
documented by Næs, Skjeltorp and Ødegaard (2011).
Figure 3: Pro-cyclicality of market 
liquidity
Source: Næs, Skjeltorp and Ødegaard (2011).
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Recessions Liquidity index
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Repo transactions can therefore become
an unreliable source of liquidity during 
financial crises, as liquidity 
transformation can cease to take place 
on the benign terms with which the cash-
borrower had become familiar. In the 
case of secured lending, a fall in 
collateral quality might prompt a de facto
“run” by creditors in the form of calls for 
additional (variation) margin. The 
mechanics of such runs contributed to 
the collapse of Lehman (Duffie, 2010).
Gorton and Metrick (2012) show that the 
crisis of 2007-08 was effectively a run in 
the US repo market, which led to a spiral of declining asset values and increasing 
repo haircuts. The declining asset values can be observed in Figure 5, which shows 
the evolution of the price for a basket of US sub-prime ABS initially rated AAA (ABX 
index vintage 2006-1). Note the strong temporary decline starting in late 2008 and 
followed by a recovery from summer 2009 onward. As Gorton and Metrick argue, 
this price collapse led to several asset classes becoming ineligible as collateral –
equivalent to a haircut of 100%.9 Gorton and Metrick’s analysis reveals how the 
crisis spread from sub-prime housing assets to other assets classes with no direct 
connection to the housing market.
The potential unreliability of short-term 
repo transactions as a source of funding 
liquidity during crises is a common 
feature across repo markets. However, 
repo markets differ in important ways, 
implying that some repo markets might 
be particularly vulnerable to runs. For 
example, one of the key technical 
characteristics which contributes to the 
fragility of the US repo tri-party repo 
market is that of the “unwind 
procedure”.10
In addition to repo, contagion via runs 
also affected other classes of short-term 
9 Gorton and Metrick show how in 2007-2008 higher counterparty credit risk, hence higher bank credit spreads, resulted in 
lower values for repo collateral (often consisting of securitised bonds). Then concerns about the liquidity of markets for the 
bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts. The combination of declining asset values and increasing haircuts
resulted in a de facto insolvency of the financial system, analogous to the banking panics of the 19th century.
10 The daily time gap between the unwind and rewind of repos drives much of the dealers’ demand for intraday funding liquidity
from the clearing banks. By contrast, “through-the-day collateral substitution” is prevalent in European tri-party repo markets: 
this is a process by which dealers can substitute collateral (including cash) into repo deals without unwinding them, in order to 
extract a needed security, possibly at multiple points in the business day. Thus, the contract design prevalent in European tri-
party repo markets virtually insulates euro repos from several (possibly systemic) threats inherent in the US tri-party repo 
mechanism, including the collapse of clearing banks, and the adverse consequences for repo sellers if the clearing bank 
exercises its right to withdraw the intraday credit extensions (see Copeland et al (2011) and Mancini et al (2016)).
Figure 4: Illiquidity spiral
Source: Adapted from Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
Figure 5: Price index of sub-prime ABS
Source: JP Morgan Datametrics.
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debt during the crisis. This is particularly true of asset-backed commercial paper and 
structured investment vehicles (Covitz, Liang and Suarez, 2009; Acharya, Schnabl, 
and Suarez, 2009). However, the possibility to “rehypothecate” collateral in a repo 
contract – i.e. the fact that a depositor of cash in the bank takes physical possession 
of bond collateral and then can reuse that collateral – makes a run in the repo 
market potentially more systemic.
The total quantity of repo transactions is
voluminous, which magnifies the 
potential impact of illiquidity spirals on 
banks’ balance sheets (Rosengren, 
2014). According to the International 
Capital Market Association’s (ICMA)
survey of 68 EU institutions, the total 
value of outstanding repos has remained 
relatively stable at around €3tn since 
2004 (Figure 6). At the end of 2013, the 
precise figure was €2.7tn, amounting to 
about 6.5% of EU banks’ total assets.11
This is a relatively large share of short-
term financing, given that most of banks’
assets are illiquid.
Part B: Information spillovers
When investors are sensitive to fundamental changes in information, bad news 
about one financial firm can prompt a run on that firm and also affect other financial 
firms. Reserve Primary Fund, a large money market mutual fund, is a case in point.
On 16 September 2008, Reserve Primary wrote down the value of its $785m claims 
on Lehman to zero and reduced its net asset value per share from $1 to $0.97. In 
response, Reserve Primary’s investors “ran” by requesting redemptions en masse,
which Reserve Primary was unable to honour. A more general run on money market 
funds followed.
In this example, there are two types of information contagion. The first type of 
information contagion is captured in Figure 7, which illustrates the effect on Firm B 
of Firm A’s default. The revelation of Lehman’s default, combined with knowledge of 
Reserve Primary’s $785m exposure to Lehman, triggered a run on the fund by its 
short-term investors. Without the run, Reserve Primary would have been able to 
survive by lowering its yield and organically growing its net asset value per share 
back to $1. At 1.2% of its total assets, Reserve Primary’s exposure to Lehman was 
substantial but manageable. But the widespread redemption calls by short-term 
investors precluded this solution. Thus the substantial-but-manageable information 
innovation (i.e. Reserve Primary’s exposure to Lehman’s default) interacted 
negatively with Reserve Primary’s structural liquidity mismatch to generate an 
unmanageable run.
11 This comparison underestimates the importance of the repo market, since ICMA’s survey includes only 68 institutions, 
whereas the total assets figure includes all EU banks.
Figure 6: Total value of 68 EU firms’ 
outstanding repos (EUR trillions)
Source: ICMA survey.
2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
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The second type of information contagion is captured in Figure 7, which illustrates
the effect of these events on Firm C. In our example, a more general run on money 
market funds followed the run on Reserve Primary. Over three days, $169bn was 
redeemed from prime institutional funds, even though most of these funds were not 
directly affected by Lehman’s bankruptcy.
Why did Lehman’s bankruptcy trigger a run on Reserve Primary and the wider 
industry of money market funds? Answering this question is key to understanding 
the mechanics of information spillovers, and requires us to return to the theory of 
runs.
In the classical banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), runs by banks’ 
unsecured short-term creditors or depositors arise as pure panic-based phenomena, 
and can happen at any time, not only during an economic or financial crisis.
Empirically, however, runs are rarely driven by pure hysteria; they rather tend to be 
related to fundamental changes in information, such as bad news about the health 
of a bank or the financial system.12 For instance, Iyer and Peydró (2011) find that,
following the sudden failure of a large cooperative bank in India, banks with higher 
interbank exposures to the failed bank suffered larger withdrawals by their 
depositors. In this case, information spillovers amplified the initial effect of direct 
contagion.
12 Empirical studies on bank contagion test whether bad news, such as a bank failure or the announcement of an unexpected 
increase in loan loss reserves, adversely affect other banks using a variety of indicators (intertemporal correlation of bank 
failures, bank risk premia and stock price reactions). See, for example, Hasan and Dwyer (1994) and Calomiris and Mason 
(2003). 
Figure 7: Potential information spillovers
Source: ESRB.
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In the theories of runs based on fundamentals, runs are usually triggered when the 
realisation of a fundamental variable (e.g. the return of the long-run project) is below 
some threshold. As a result, relatively small changes in the information environment 
can lead to large changes in behaviour (Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988). In the 
model of Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2011), a small change in the fundamental 
value of an asset used as collateral in the short-term debt market can be associated 
with a sudden collapse in the debt capacity of a firm. This result is related to the lack 
of arrival of good news about the value of the asset used as collateral to roll over 
debt when the tenor of the debt is very short.
Both the pure panic-based and the fundamentals-based views of runs are 
synthesised by the global games literature, in which poor fundamentals trigger self-
fulfilling beliefs about a financial crisis: a crisis occurs if a sufficiently large 
proportion of depositors withdraw from a bank, creditors do not roll over debt or 
currency speculators attack a peg.13 Ahnert and Kakhbod (2015) show how a small 
change in public information about bank fundamentals can result in a large change 
in the proportion of informed investors and thus increase the probability of a 
financial crisis.
Instead of focusing on the ex post effects of a failure or change in the fundamental 
value of assets, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) analyse the ex ante response of 
banks to adverse news about other banks. They show that information contagion 
can occur when bank loan returns have a common systematic factor: a bank’s 
borrowing cost increases following adverse news about another bank since such 
news conveys adverse information about the common factor. Ex ante, the likelihood 
of such “information contagion” induces bank owners to herd with other banks and 
undertake correlated investments, for instance by lending to similar industries, in 
order to minimise their expected borrowing costs.
The link between commonality in bank asset portfolios and information contagion is 
analysed in a network setting in Allen, Babus and Carletti (2012). They show that 
when bank debt is short-term, and the portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque, 
creditors can decide not to roll over debt in response to adverse aggregate signals 
about bank solvency. Greater commonality in bank portfolios increases the 
likelihood of information contagion.
Caballero and Simsek (2013) provide a related theoretical model embedding 
uncertainty about the asset structure of banks. In their model, the complexity of 
financial linkages creates uncertainty about the network of cross-exposures of 
banks. Since domino effects are more likely in crises, banks become concerned that 
they can be affected via third parties. The structure of the network matters since 
uncertainty is higher for “distant” exposures. Such uncertainty can dramatically 
amplify banks’ perceived counterparty risk, and make them reluctant to buy risky 
assets. Ultimately, banks can even turn into sellers: the model features a fire sale
equilibrium, in which the price of legacy assets collapses.
13 See Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Rochet and Vives (2004) and Aldasoro and Faia (2015) for an application to bank runs.
11
ESRB Occasional Paper No. 9
January 2016
Indirect contagion: the policy problem
Section 2: Existing policies to mitigate indirect contagion14
Effective policy design must be firmly grounded on the identification of market 
failures or other externalities which policy intervention can correct. For example, the 
propagation of financial shocks through the liquidation of positions in securities is
not necessarily the manifestation of a market failure. In certain circumstances, such 
propagation is simply a natural process by which the financial system absorbs
shocks.
However, one place to look for social losses is bankruptcy. Bankruptcy entails
deadweight losses, and the risk in a systemic event is the accumulation of 
numerous bankruptcies. Many of the behaviours we have described in this paper 
are triggered by financial firms’ concern about getting close to the zero equity 
constraint. Similarly, liquidity constraints are an additional determinant of financial 
actors’ behaviour in response to shocks; the trigger of bankruptcies is often 
illiquidity, rather than insolvency.
As a result, indirect contagion tends to spread market failures. This motivates policy 
intervention to reduce the risk of indirect channels of contagion. Since 2008, a wide 
array of policy reforms has helped to fix the fault lines that caused the global 
financial crisis. The FSB (2014) describes this job as “substantially complete”. Since 
illiquidity spirals and information spillovers played an integral role in the recent crisis, 
as they have in crises throughout financial history, many of these policy reforms 
help to build systemic resilience to indirect contagion. This section highlights the 
main reforms from the point of view of mitigating the effects of indirect contagion. 
Policies that strengthen the financial system against direct contagion also improve 
systemic resilience to indirect contagion. For example, by improving banks’ loss-
absorbency capacity, capital regulation makes each bank more resilient to losses on 
direct exposures, while simultaneously reducing the extent to which banks are 
forced to fire-sell assets to meet short-term obligations.
The list of policies considered below will therefore look familiar, but we consider 
them in terms of their effectiveness in dampening indirect channels of contagion. As 
in Section 1, we focus on the market-price channel and the information channel. We 
do not seek to be exhaustive in characterising the full range of policies that can 
mitigate each channel; instead, we focus on the most relevant elements, with a view 
to characterising the current regulatory landscape. 
The market price channel
Capital regulation. Limiting the degree of leverage on financial firms’ 
balance sheets ensures that there is sufficient equity to absorb unexpected 
losses in most adverse scenarios. Firms are (indirectly) hit by mark-to-market 
losses when they hold assets correlated with a fire-sold asset. With sufficient 
equity, these losses can be managed – allowing the firm to hold on to illiquid 
assets at least until the fire sale is over and asset prices have returned to 
their fundamental value. Well capitalised financial firms are also more likely to 
14 This section was written by the authors, with substantial contributions from Alex Hodbod.
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retain their access to sources of short-term funding, such as the repo market, 
during crises. In this way, less leveraged firms have a lower conditional 
contribution to fire sale externalities, as shown empirically by Duarte and 
Eisenbach (2015). The strengthening of the quality and quantity of capital for 
credit institutions under the CRD IV and CRR package therefore helps to 
mitigate EU banks’ tendency to exacerbate illiquidity spirals. Moreover, the 
introduction of macroprudential capital regulation – including time-varying 
buffers, add-ons for systemically important institutions and the systemic risk 
buffer – ensures that requirements are targeted when and where they are 
most valuable.
Liquidity regulation. In the absence of strong liquidity regulation, banks with 
deposit insurance and access to central banks’ lender of last resort facilities 
have an ex ante incentive to take additional liquidity risk. The result of this 
moral hazard is a socially excessive liquidity mismatch within the financial 
system. The introduction of microprudential liquidity regulation within the 
CRR, including the liquidity coverage requirement (which aims to ensure that 
short-term funding is matched by liquid assets) and the net stable funding 
requirement (which requires that illiquid assets are funded by stable 
liabilities), improves banks’ liquidity positions, and thereby lowers their 
conditional contribution to spirals of illiquidity. However, liquidity regulation 
could be improved by introducing a macroprudential component, including 
variation both over time and in the cross-section of financial firms, as 
described in Section 3.
Regulation on securities financing transactions. Securities financing 
transactions and collateral reuse are employed by many financial institutions 
– including banks, securities dealers, insurance companies, and funds – with 
the purpose of obtaining additional cash or achieving additional flexibility in 
carrying out a particular investment strategy. The reuse of collateral to 
support multiple securities financing deals permits increased leverage and 
interconnectedness in the system. The G20 and the FSB have thus 
concluded that securities financing transactions have the propensity to 
increase the build-up of leverage in the financial system as well as to create 
contagion channels between different financial sectors. The EU regulation on 
reporting and transparency of securities financing transactions shall enable 
central banks, regulators and supervisors to correctly assess and monitor
risks and interconnectedness in the financial system arising from SFTs.
Proposed regulation on money market funds. MMFs are important owing 
to the direct connections between banks and MMFs – via the large amounts 
of funding that MMFs provide to banks, and via the implicit sponsorship role 
that banks can play for MMFs – and as a potential source of indirect 
contagion through the market price channel. MMFs have traditionally 
undertaken some degree of maturity and liquidity transformation, but without 
the same prudential regulation to which banks are subject – and without 
formal access to the central bank lender of last resort function. This left 
MMFs vulnerable to runs, which in turn made them potential fire-sellers of 
assets. In recognition of these concerns, the European Commission 
proposed an MMF Regulation in September 2013. This proposal aims to 
13
ESRB Occasional Paper No. 9
January 2016
Indirect contagion: the policy problem
broaden the perimeter of prudential regulation to MMFs and to make the 
MMFs more resilient – and thereby less susceptible to the risk of runs and 
fire sales.
Proposed regulation on bank structural reform. A key issue brought to 
light by the global financial crisis is the systemic importance of large, complex 
and interconnected institutions, which are therefore difficult to manage, 
supervise and resolve. The European Commission proposal for structural 
reform of the European banking system – which is currently being negotiated 
at the EU level – is aimed at addressing the issue of too-big-to-fail banks, 
thus complementing other post-crisis reforms introduced in the EU. Structural 
reforms should contribute to building more resilience; decreasing the risk of 
bank failures; and facilitating supervision and resolution. The Commission 
proposal tries to achieve these goals by providing for a ban on speculative 
trading (proprietary trading) and for the separation of other activities which 
can be particularly risky, such as derivatives trading.
Proposed initiatives on the “capital markets union”. The capital markets 
union agenda aims to integrate and deepen Europe’s fragmented capital 
markets (Juncker, 2014; Hill, 2014; Hill, 2015). Deeper capital markets 
mitigate the risk of illiquidity spirals by increasing market liquidity, thereby 
reducing the scope of fire sale externalities generated by a highly leveraged 
banking sector (Langfield and Pagano, 2016). A diverse array of policies 
could help to deepen capital markets, and thereby mitigate the systemic risk 
arising from indirect contagion (European Commission, 2015a). These 
policies are mostly structural, and would therefore not be implemented by 
macroprudential authorities – but they are nevertheless of macroprudential 
interest.
Information spillovers
Transparency of banks’ balance sheets. The opacity of bank balance 
sheets is a major cause of financial instability, as we say in part B of Section 
1. In the absence of adequate information disclosure, distress at one 
institution can quickly spread others. CRDIV improves transparency 
regarding the activities of credit institutions, in particular with regard to profits, 
taxes and subsidies in different jurisdictions. In addition, a substantial 
quantity of information has been disclosed as part of the EU-wide stress test 
exercises mandated by the EBA regulation. These disclosure enhancements
are essential steps towards diminishing the potency of the information 
channel of contagion across the financial system.
Market infrastructure. Extensive use of central clearing implies a substantial 
reduction in systemic risk. The adoption by the G20 (2009) of a commitment 
to centrally clear standardised OTC derivative contracts, which in the EU was 
implemented in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), 
should therefore be lauded. By stepping into a formerly bilateral trade, central 
counterparties help to reduce network complexity and opacity and thereby 
the potential for indirect contagion arising from information spillovers.
Furthermore, central counterparties protect clearing members from the 
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default of a counterparty, thereby minimising the risk of a disorderly sell-off of 
the securities that would have been pledged as collateral in non-centrally 
cleared transactions. However, CCPs can also be a source of systemic risk. 
Some CCPs may be “super systemic” (Tucker, 2014): too big and 
interconnected to fail without triggering financial instability. The increasingly 
central role played by CCPs within the financial system underscores the 
importance of ensuring that CCPs are sufficiently resilient.
Resolution. Financial firms which become insolvent can cause wider 
disruption if they are wound up using ordinary insolvency proceedings, owing 
to their direct and indirect connections with other firms. Disorderly insolvency 
can also cause information spillovers via a broader loss of confidence, as 
observed following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers owing to uncertainty 
about the loss allocation mechanism. Special procedures, such as those 
provided for in the EU’s Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, ought to be 
superior to ordinary insolvency law. Moreover, the BRRD provides greater 
clarity about how losses will be allocated among liability holders in the event 
of resolution.
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Section 3: New policies to mitigate indirect contagion
Indirect contagion spreads market failure. In the case of illiquidity spirals, firms do 
not internalise the negative externality of holding low levels of funding liquidity or of 
fire-selling assets into a dry market. Lack of information and information 
asymmetries can cause markets to unravel owing to relatively minor news. In both 
cases, market players act in ways which are privately optimal but socially harmful.
These market failures motivate policy intervention. The role of macroprudential 
policy is to enhance systemic resilience to indirect contagion with minimal 
unintended distortions to intermediation. In Section 2, we described the post-crisis 
regulatory reforms that will contribute to the mitigation of indirect channels of 
contagion. However, additional reforms may be necessary owing to the confluence 
of three factors.
First, a flurry of reforms was introduced over 2008-15 with the primary 
objective of achieving greater systemic stability. Understandably, the 
efficiency of regulations was of second-order concern. The regulatory 
community now has the opportunity to reflect on whether the same degree of 
systemic stability can be achieved with lower impediments to financial 
intermediation. In this respect, the EU Commission (2015b) has launched a 
consultation on “whether there are unintended barriers to new market 
players and innovative businesses preventing them from entering markets 
and challenging incumbents”. Part A of this section – which focuses on the 
efficiency gains from a macroprudential application of liquidity regulation –
goes in this direction of enhanced efficiency.
Second, financial institutions respond endogenously to policies. Given that 
regulations are invariably costly, institutions have an incentive to avoid 
regulations by performing the same economic function within a different legal 
structure. In macroprudential policy, an activities-based, rather than entities-
based, approach is generally more robust to regulatory arbitrage, since 
requirements apply regardless of entities’ legal structures. Part B of this 
section – which proposes restrictions on margins (for derivatives 
transactions) and haircuts (for derivatives and securities financing 
transactions) – puts forward one such arbitrage-robust macroprudential 
policy.
Third, although post-crisis reforms to financial regulation have been 
extensive, policy could benefit from some extensions in order to ensure 
maximal systemic resilience. In the past, the ESRB has pointed to 
aggressive anti-trust policy with respect to large banks (Pagano et al, 2014) 
and a macroprudential application of the leverage ratio (ESRB, 2015) as 
potential policy innovations worthy of consideration. In Part C of this section, 
we highlight the potential benefits of enhanced information disclosure. 
Historically, authorities in Europe have been more reticent than those in 
other jurisdictions, such as the US, to liberally disclose information on 
financial institutions. We argue that this tradition is misguided, and that 
enhanced disclosure can help to mitigate the negative information spillovers 
described in Section 1.
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Macroprudential policymakers should consider whether these three policy tools –
macroprudential liquidity regulation, restrictions on margins and haircuts, and 
enhanced information disclosure, outlined in Parts A, B and C of this section –
would effectively enhance resilience to indirect contagion, and how these policies 
could be designed to achieve maximum effect with minimum cost. 
These three policy tools are presented in this paper in general terms in order to 
frame a high-level policy discussion. The paper therefore refrains from examining 
detailed implementation issues (such as the calibration of policy tools), which would 
need to be resolved by technical working groups.
Part A: Macroprudential liquidity regulation15
The policy objective is to dampen illiquidity spirals through the macroprudential 
application of liquidity regulation. Effective liquidity regulation dampens illiquidity 
spirals by mitigating and preventing excessive maturity mismatch and by reducing
moral hazard (ESRB, 2013).16
Traditionally, common insurance for retail deposits allowed banks to credibly co-
insure against idiosyncratic runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). But deposit 
insurance is likely to be insufficient in modern financial markets, given that banks 
are substantially funded by debt and wholesale deposits.
One solution to this moral hazard problem is to price LOLR funding in such a way 
that banks pay a penalty for accessing emergency central bank funding (Bagehot, 
1873). However, penalty policies might not be time-consistent, as central banks 
have an incentive to offer cheap liquidity when a crisis occurs.17 Moreover, LOLR 
funding is socially costly when illiquid institutions’ insolvency risks, and the risks of 
changes in the market price of pledged collateral, are non-zero – since any credit or 
market losses suffered by the central bank are implicitly borne by taxpayers.
New liquidity regulations – the liquidity coverage requirement (LCR) and the net 
stable funding requirement (NSFR)18 – aim to overcome market failures arising from 
15 This part was written by the authors, with substantial contributions from Iñaki Aldasoro.
16 Moral hazard with respect to liquidity risk-taking is generated by deposit insurance and access to lender of last resort 
facilities. Deposit insurance reduces incentives for depositors to monitor banks’ activities and for banks to self-insure against 
liquidity risk. LOLR facilities distort ex ante incentives by encouraging eligible institutions to take socially excessive liquidity 
risks (Acharya et al, 2014). Once solvency problems have materialised, eligible institutions with low franchise value have an 
incentive to extract rent from the subsidy implicit in undercollateralised LOLR facilities by shifting downside risk onto the LOLR 
(Drechsler et al, 2016).
17 Even time-consistent commitment devices – such as Australia’s Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF), which requires banks to 
pay up-front fees – risk under-pricing future LOLR access, since liquidity crises are infrequent and uncertain, while banks’ CLF 
subscriptions are immediate and certain.
18 The LCR requires banks to hold enough unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (with differential weights) to meet stressed 
outflows over one month (BCBS, 2013). In the EU, implementation of the LCR is being phased in, starting from 60% in 
October 2015 to 100% in January 2018. The NSFR will require banks to hold a certain quantity of stable funding (defined as 
The ultimate backstop for banks’ structural liquidity mismatch is the central bank, 
which can act as lender of last resort (LOLR) to illiquid-but-solvent institutions. But 
this LOLR promise creates moral hazard: banks have an incentive to increase their 
liquidity mismatch in good times (to boost profitability) in the knowledge that funding 
will be available from the central bank in bad times.
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interconnectedness and the moral hazard borne by LOLR facilities. When a firm 
makes its balance sheet more robust to liquidity shocks, it not only improves its own 
liquidity position, but also benefits those of its creditors. This generates a positive 
externality; as such, there is a potential for market failure (as liquidity may be under-
supplied by private agents). Moreover, liquidity regulation also aims to decrease the 
moral hazard generated by backstops such as deposit insurance, government bail-
outs and central banks’ lender of last resort facilities (Ratnovski, 2009; Farhi and 
Tirole, 2012; Stein, 2013), which is largest for banks in general and systemically 
important institutions in particular (Santos and Suarez, 2015).
Liquidity regulation entails a trade-off. On one hand, liquidity regulation needs to be 
stringent enough that banks rely less on costly LOLR facilities. On the other hand, a 
regulatory system based on quantities should avoid creating excess demand for 
high-quality liquid assets, which are in finite supply, as this would disrupt banks’ 
provision of liquidity to the real economy (Weitzman, 1974). Optimally balancing this 
trade-off requires policymakers to have a more precise empirical grasp of illiquidity 
spirals and the social costs of LOLR facilities (Rochet, 2008).
Liquidity regulation is currently applied via microprudential requirements, which
operate by reducing individual firms’ liquidity risk. Microprudential requirements also 
help to contain systemic liquidity risk (Ahnert, 2014). To further contain systemic 
liquidity risk, the LCR and NSFR could be applied in a more explicitly 
macroprudential manner (ESRB, 2014).
The macroprudential application of liquidity regulation has two dimensions: time-
variation and cross-sectional variation in requirements. These two dimensions of 
macroprudential liquidity regulation, summarised in Table 1, could be used by 
authorities once the effects of the microprudential application of the LCR and NSFR 
have been fully observed and understood.19 In the longer-term, more innovative 
policy tools could be considered:
a simple tool analogous to the leverage ratio, such as liquid assets to non-
equity liabilities (Hardy and Hochreiter, 2014); 
price-based tools, such as a Pigouvian tax (Perotti and Suarez, 2011);
variation – for macroprudential reasons – of the weights assigned to assets 
or liabilities in the calculation of the NSFR (Bicu et al, 2014). A similar 
approach could be taken for the LCR by varying eligibility criteria for HQLA.
customer deposits, long-term wholesale funding and equity) relative to long-dated assets (with differential weights by asset 
and maturity classes) (BCBS, 2014).
19 For example, one potential drawback of liquidity regulation is that it encourages regulated institutions to invest in similar
portfolios, which become more correlated. The application of microprudential liquidity regulation will permit authorities to fully
understand this effect, and therefore appropriately calibrate the macroprudential application of these tools.
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Table 1: A macroprudential approach to liquidity regulation
Time-variation Cross-sectional variation
Description Tighter liquidity requirements in 
the upswing, when funding 
liquidity is abundant and 
interconnectedness as well as 
liquidity risks are building up; 
and looser requirements in the 
downswing. 
Tighter liquidity requirements for 
“liquidity SIFIs”, and looser 
requirements for relatively 
unimportant institutions.
Objective Raise resilience to and lean 
against the build-up of systemic 
liquidity risk over time.
Reduce the externalities created 
by institutions which contribute 
most to systemic liquidity risk.
Legal basis Pillar 2 (CRDIV, Art.103) or 
stricter national measures (CRR 
Art.458).20
Institution-specific requirements to 
address “systemic liquidity risk” 
(CRDIV, Art.105) applied to banks 
with similar risk profiles (Art.103).
Calibration Calibrated to time-varying 
measures of the availability of 
funding liquidity (e.g. bank debt 
issuance relative to history) and 
its cost (e.g. spreads such as 
Libor-OIS and longer-term 
funding costs). Other measures 
of liquidity risk, such as loan-to-
deposit ratios, refinancing 
profiles or a “liquidity mismatch 
index” (Brunnermeier et al,
2014; Bai et al, 2015) could also 
be considered. See Bicu et al
(2014); Bonfim and Kim (2014); 
Dijum and Wierts (2016).
Calibrated to institutions’ 
contribution to systemic liquidity 
risk – measured by the extent of 
institutions’ importance in providing 
short-term funding liquidity to other 
institutions; their exposure to 
sudden margin calls and 
evaporation of short-term intra-
financial lending; and their 
exposure to commonly held illiquid 
assets (market liquidity). See 
Aldasoro and Faia (2015) and 
Ferrara et al (2016).
Macroprudential liquidity regulation promises greater efficiency, because 
requirements bind only when and where they are most needed (see Box 1) – when 
liquidity risks are building up and in the institutions which make the greatest 
contribution to systemic liquidity risk. Greater efficiency is important, because tighter 
aggregate liquidity requirements increase the costs of firms’ liquidity transformation 
services (Segura and Suarez, 2014). Macroprudential liquidity regulation therefore 
allows society to reap the benefits of lower systemic risk, while keeping the costs of 
tighter aggregate requirements to a minimum.
20 Temporary non-compliance with the LCR is provided for in CRR Art.414, but only for microprudential purposes.
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Box 1: Macroprudential liquidity regulation: Lower systemic risk at no extra cost
Imagine that authorities have decided at a given point in time the prudential policy 
stance for liquidity regulation: that is, the level of aggregate liquidity requirements for 
the system as a whole. How should this aggregate requirement be distributed 
across firms?
The microprudential answer is: “the same requirement for each individual firm”. For 
example, the microprudential application of the LCR would require all firms to hold 
sufficient liquid assets to survive an outflow of liabilities over the specified period. 
But if the policy objective is to reduce systemic risk, then firms which contribute 
most to systemic liquidity risk should face a tighter requirement, while relatively 
unimportant firms should face a looser requirement (Perotti and Suarez, 2011).
This view is reflected in a model of 
optimising banks with a network 
structure and multiple channels of 
contagion and amplification 
(Aldasoro and Faia, 2015).21
Figure 8 shows the results in 
terms of the level of systemic risk 
(over 1,000 simulated shocks) 
under three policy regimes. When 
authorities set liquidity 
requirements at zero, systemic risk 
across the 1,000 simulated shocks 
is relatively high. A flat 
microprudential liquidity 
requirement (calibrated as a 
minimum of 10% liquid assets to 
total deposits) decreases median systemic risk by about 50%. Systemic risk is 
further reduced through the macroprudential application of liquidity regulation: when 
the 10 most systemically important banks are subject to a liquidity requirement of 
12.5%, while all other banks are subject to proportionally lower requirements, 
systemic risk unambiguously decreases.
Ferrara et al (2016) obtain a similar result using Bank of England data on banks’ 
short-term liabilities, including interbank borrowing and lending. They find that tighter 
LCR requirements for “liquidity SIFIs” would reduce the severity of a systemic 
liquidity crisis for a given aggregate stock of liquid assets in the banking system.
A similar logic applies to time-varying liquidity requirements. In principle, it is more 
efficient for aggregate liquidity requirements to be relatively tight when funding 
liquidity is abundant and interconnectedness and liquidity risks are building up.
21 The model features optimising risk-averse banks interacting in the interbank market and investing in non-liquid assets. 
Contagion occurs via fire sale externalities, interbank exposures and liquidity hoarding on the asset side, and runs on short-
term funding on the liability side, the latter based on an underlying global game. Systemic risk is measured as the share of 
assets of defaulting banks to total assets following a shock to the system, while systemic banks are identified based on the G-
SIB methodology. The model is calibrated to the network of large European banks (as in Alves et al, 2013).
Figure 8: Systemic risk under three policies
Source: Aldasoro and Faia (2015).
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Significant liquidity mismatches can also be present in non-bank financial firms –
even though asset managers differ from banks or insurers in that they typically act 
as “agents” rather than “principals”. The systemic externality arises when investors
wish to have shares or units redeemed, but the cash amount in the fund is not 
sufficient – in this scenario, investment funds might be forced to fire-sell illiquid 
assets, potentially triggering or exacerbating illiquidity spirals in the whole financial 
sector.
The macroprudential application of liquidity regulation could therefore be extended 
beyond the banking sector. From an investor perspective, both UCITS22 and 
AIFMD23 already have various requirements in relation to liquidity management 
which are designed to limit institution-specific liquidity risks. However, these
microprudential regulations do not necessarily mitigate systemic liquidity risk directly 
as they are not targeted at externalities (such as fire sale externalities).
In the first instance, authorities should better understand the creation of systemic 
liquidity risk by non-banks, in particular by:
engaging in a data collection initiative to fully understand and quantify non-
banks’ liquidity mismatches;
undertaking an empirical assessment of the importance of the fire sale 
channel, by quantifying the elasticity of asset prices to these sales both in 
normal times and in times of generalised distress;
carrying out macroprudential stress tests to assess potential systemic 
liquidity risks due to specific products or underlying asset markets; and
designating global systemically important non-bank and non-insurer financial 
institutions and subjecting them to intensive supervision and regulation,
following a common global methodology (FSB-IOSCO, 2015).
In the longer term, authorities could consider developing measures to reduce the 
creation of systemic liquidity risk by non-banks. For money market funds and certain 
types of investment funds, measures could include redemption gates, which 
quantitatively restrict outflows by investors; redemption fees, which disincentivise 
outflows; and liquidity requirements at the fund-level. When there are negative 
externalities, authorities could pay particular attention to investment funds’ existing 
obligations to ensure that redemption frequencies correspond to their investments.24
22 The UCITS requirements are more prescriptive than those for AIFMs, reflecting the fact that UCITS are supposed to be 
liquid products that can be sold cross-border to retail clients on the basis of an EU passport. The Eligible Assets Directive of 
2007 requires liquidity to be ensured for all investments by UCITS, and sets out specific rules for the eligibility of transferable 
securities, money market instruments and financial derivative instruments.
23 The AIFMD requires AIFMs to put in place liquidity management requirements if they manage open-ended AIFs or closed-
ended AIFs which are leveraged. This includes an alignment of the investment strategy, liquidity prof ile and redemption policy 
of the fund, as well as putting in place appropriate liquidity management limits and stress tests.
24 For example, authorities could require certain investment funds to bring their redemption profiles in line with the liquidity of 
underlying assets, so that funds investing in relatively illiquid assets (e.g. high-yield bonds, leveraged loans) are not allowed to 
provide daily or intraday liquidity to end investors.
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Part B: Restrictions on margins and haircuts25
The policy objective is to dampen illiquidity spirals, which could be exacerbated by 
sudden, large and pro-cyclical increases in margins and haircuts.26 Risk 
management models are prone to generate sudden increases as they are sensitive 
to volatility spikes.27 These increases in margins and haircuts reduce counterparties’ 
funding liquidity and potentially force them to sell assets at discounted prices. This 
could create the conditions for a systemic illiquidity spiral, whereby the fire sale 
leads to additional increases in margins and haircuts, exacerbating funding 
illiquidity.
Restrictions on margins and haircuts could reduce pro-cyclicality by dampening 
illiquidity spirals.28 Restrictions on margins could be applied to derivatives 
transactions (whether centrally cleared or non-centrally cleared);29 restrictions on 
collateral haircuts could be applied both to derivatives transactions and securities 
financing transactions.
Restrictions could be applied to the level of or the change in margins and haircuts
(see Table 2). Minimum haircuts have already been envisaged by the FSB (2015)
for non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions.30 This approach could be 
broadened by setting time-varying minimum requirements31 or by setting step limits 
on the change in margins and haircuts within a given time period.32 These two 
macroprudential policy options have pros and cons, which are discussed here.
25 This part was written by the authors, with substantial contributions from Henrik Hansen and Falk Mazelis.
26 This broadly corresponds to the intermediate objective of macroprudential policy to mitigate and prevent “excessive maturity 
mismatch and market illiquidity”. Time-varying restrictions on margins or haircuts would also help to reduce leverage in the 
expansionary part of the financial cycle, and thereby contribute to another intermediate objective of macroprudential policy – to 
lean against “excessive credit growth and leverage” (ESRB, 2013).
27 For example, initial margins set by CCPs on foreign exchange futures contracts increased substantially following the 
surprise removal by the Swiss National Bank of the EUR/CHF floor of 1.2 on 15 January 2015. In the case of CME, initial 
margins on CHF/USD futures approximately doubled immediately following the SNB’s announcement (see 
http://goo.gl/kmo0xY). ICE implemented a similar increase for CHF/USD. For CHF/EUR futures with an exercise date of March 
2016 (see https://goo.gl/rw4MH1), ICE’s increase was even higher: initial margins increased by a factor of over six according 
to ICE data (see https://goo.gl/Rfwn9K). 
28 Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002) find that high margin requirements when asset prices are rising may have a stabilising 
impact on stock market volatility, with no negative impact caused by lowering margins when asset prices are declining 
substantially. More recently, BIS-CGFS (2010) reviewed margining practices in SFTs and OTC derivatives markets and 
recommended that macroprudential authorities consider measures that involve counter-cyclical variations in margins. This 
sentiment is echoed in BCBS-IOSCO (2015) and in FSB (2014b), where it is noted that authorities could vary numerical floors 
as a macroprudential tool.
29 For CCPs, the EMIR RTS (article 28) currently requires that a CCP shall employ at least one of the following three options to
limit the pro-cyclicality of margin models: (i) a floor on margins that is calculated using volatility estimated over a 10-year 
historical look-back period; (ii) a buffer margin that can be temporarily exhausted during periods in which calculated margin 
requirements are rising significantly; and (iii) assigning at least a 25% weight to stressed observations in the look-back period.
30 The FSB published a regulatory framework for haircuts on non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions (SFTs) in 
November 2015. This framework includes numerical haircut floors that would apply to transactions in which collateral other 
than government securities is used.
31 A broadly equivalent policy option would be to set a counter-cyclical add-on on top of constant minimum requirements.
32 Furthermore, these instruments could be supplemented by setting static minimum haircuts also for derivatives transactions.
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Table 2: The application of restrictions to margins or haircuts
Time-varying minima 
(see Figure 9)
Step limits
(see Figure 10)
Description A time-varying floor on the level 
of margins or haircuts. 
A ceiling on the size of the 
increase in margins or haircuts 
over a given time period.
Objective Dampen the effect of sudden, large and pro-cyclical increases in 
margins and haircuts on the exacerbation of illiquidity spirals.
Legal basis For derivatives, the EMIR review is an opportunity to consider 
whether macroprudential tools could be useful to address the pro-
cyclicality of margins and haircuts, both for cleared and non-centrally 
cleared derivatives. For SFTs, regulatory restrictions on haircuts on 
collateral could be implemented in the regulation on SFTs – or in 
other primary legislation in the longer-term future, permitting deeper 
analysis of the effects of such haircut restrictions.
Calibration Calibrated by regulators 
according to indicators of
business and financial cycles or 
asset-specific measures of stress 
(e.g. bid-ask spreads; volumes 
traded).
Calibrated by market participants 
according to their own risk 
management models (pursuant to 
supervisory guidance). The onus 
is thus on participants to apply 
their risk management models 
prudently given the step limit 
constraint.
The difference between the outcomes generated by time-varying regulatory minima 
and step limits is illustrated in figures 9 and 10 with stylised examples. All panels 
consider the impact of a shock event, which results in an increase in the margin or 
haircut that would be requested by a counterparty in the absence of regulatory 
intervention (illustrated by the jump in the dashed black line). The solid red line 
illustrates the regulatory requirement in each scenario: in panel A, regulators and 
market participants are assumed to have no foresight about future events; in panel 
B, they have partial foresight; and in panel C, they have full foresight.
When a stress event is partially or fully anticipated by regulators and market 
participants, time-varying minima and step limits could generate similar outcomes
(see panels B and C). In the case of time-varying minima, regulators impose a 
gradually increasing add-on in anticipation of a shock event, thereby preventing or 
mitigating the magnitude of the sudden increase in margins or haircuts immediately 
following the stress event (see Figures 9b and 9c). In the case of step limits, market 
participants would increase margins and haircuts (relative to those that they would 
have set in the absence of step limits) in anticipation of a future stress event (see 
Figures 9b and 9c). This behaviour is rational: if market participants did not increase 
margins and haircuts pre-emptively, despite (partially) anticipating the stress event, 
they would be exposed to excessive counterparty credit risk following the stress 
event (analogous to the situation illustrated in Figure 9a).
23
ESRB Occasional Paper No. 9
January 2016
Indirect contagion: the policy problem
Time-varying minima and step limits would generate different outcomes if regulators 
and market participants had different expectations regarding the probability of a 
future stress event. Market participants might have more information regarding 
future stress probability; step limits would put the onus on market participants to 
utilise this private information effectively. In addition, market participants are not
subject to the political economy problems which could lead to inaction bias in the 
case of time-varying minima.
Time-varying minima and step limits also differ in their treatment of unanticipated 
stress events, which occur when no adequate buffer has been built up (see panel 
A):
With time-varying minimum requirements, the sudden increase in margins or 
haircuts occurs unimpeded: in Figure 9a, the dashed black line increases 
suddenly, as it would in the absence of any regulation on margins or haircuts. 
In this scenario, there remains an unmitigated systemic risk of a self-
reinforcing illiquidity spiral.
With step limits, by contrast, the increase in margins or haircuts immediately 
following the stress event is constrained: margins or haircuts may be
increased only gradually to the level preferred by the counterparty (see 
Figure 9a). In this scenario, the risk of a systemic illiquidity spiral is reduced, 
but potentially with unintended consequences. Short-term trades that are not 
centrally cleared may not be rolled over, as counterparties would be 
prevented from demanding adequate insurance against counterparty credit 
risk. At the extreme, the repo and derivatives markets could evaporate. At the 
same time, trades that are centrally cleared would generate excessive credit 
risk for the central counterparty until the CCP is permitted to increase 
margins and haircuts to their desired level. Given that CCPs are “super 
systemic” (Tucker, 2014), this risk transfer could increase overall systemic 
risk. In light of these potential unintended consequences, the imposition of 
step limits on increases in margins or haircuts should be considered 
carefully.33
Both time-varying minima and step limits have substantial potential to 
dampen the risk of illiquidity spirals. Their effectiveness in practice depends on 
calibration and implementation. Setting minimum margin requirements too high, for 
example, would partially impede risk-sharing and therefore increase the cost of 
intermediation (Goodhart et al, 2012). Moreover, a broad application across 
products and markets is important to limit regulatory arbitrage (Brumm et al, 2015). 
The same point holds across jurisdictions: in the presence of significant regulatory 
differences across jurisdictions, activity could shift to regions where regulation is 
less restrictive. Cooperation across jurisdictions in the implementation of restrictions 
on margins and haircuts is therefore essential.
33 The systemic importance of CCPs underscores the importance of designing a credible resolution framework for CCPs 
(Cœuré, 2014; Duffie, 2015). Central banks could also consider extending access to lender of last resort facilities to CCPs 
(see EMIR, recital 71). Granting CCPs access to central bank liquidity could reduce the risk that a CCP would contribute to a 
system-wide illiquidity spiral by fire-selling collateral in the event of a default by a clearing member, albeit at the potential cost 
of greater moral hazard. In November 2014, the Bank of England announced that CCPs operating in UK markets may apply 
for participation in the sterling monetary framework, including the Bank of England’s discount window.
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Figure 9: Time-varying minimum margins or haircuts
Panel A: No foresight Panel B: Partial foresight
Source: ESRB.
Panel C: Full foresight
Figure 10: Step limits on the change in margins or haircuts
Panel A: No foresight Panel B: Partial foresight Panel C: Full foresight
Time
No restriction
Time
Time-varying minimum
No restriction
Time
Time-varying minimum
No restriction
Time
Step limit (no foresight)
No restriction
Time
Step limit (partial foresight)
No restriction
Time
Step limit (full foresight)
No restriction
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Part C: Information disclosure
The policy objective is to mitigate negative information spillovers, and thus to 
prevent negative externalities at times of systemic financial stress.
Policymakers could utilise their information advantage over market participants to 
reduce noise and uncertainty. This policy is particularly beneficial at times of stress, 
when uncertainty can cause market liquidity to deteriorate rapidly. In this sense, 
generous and credible information disclosure can help to limit indirect contagion and 
potentially prevent a materialisation of systemic risk. As Lo (2013) writes:
“Policymakers would do well to focus more on clear, accurate, timely, and 
regular communication with the public throughout periods of significant 
turmoil, irrespective of the cause. Only through such trusted communication 
can fear be successfully managed, and ultimately, eliminated. If active 
management of fear involves greater communication and transparency, a 
prerequisite is the collection and dissemination of information regarding 
systemic risk.” 
Authorities can choose the level of granularity, complexity, frequency and 
publication lag of the information disclosure in order to reap the benefits of 
information disclosure while minimising potential costs (Landier and Thesmar, 
2011). These costs arise when:
the information innovation exacerbates the asymmetry in market participants’ 
knowledge, as processing the information is costly (Pagano and Volpin, 
2010);
market participants place too much emphasis on public information rather 
their own privately produced information, and therefore overreact to the 
disclosure of information (Morris and Shin, 2002);
predatory traders use the information to trigger and exacerbate fire sales of 
marketable securities (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005);
market participants subject to the disclosure requirement manipulate the 
disclosed information to their own advantage (Holmström and Milgrom, 
1991);
the information innovation reveals bad fundamental news without any 
remedy, such as adequate capital and liquidity buffers and a credible 
resolution regime (Vives, 2014).
The effectiveness of this policy depends on the credibility of the competent 
authority. Ad hoc disclosure of information could suffer from credibility problems, 
since market participants may suspect that the newly released information has been 
selectively disclosed. To solve this credibility problem, authorities should aim to 
build credibility over time by committing to regular disclosure of information. 
Regularly disclosed information is also likely to be of higher quality. Examples of 
high-quality regular information disclosure in the US include the call reports for 
banks and 13Fs for asset managers and life insurers.
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Once credibility is established, authorities could consider targeted information 
disclosure to alleviate specific market concerns at times of stress. The alleviation of 
market concerns regarding euro area banks’ asset quality following the ECB’s 
disclosure of information as part of its comprehensive assessment is an example of 
how targeted information disclosure can be successful. To formalise the process of 
information disclosure, the proposed policy would require the following steps to be 
taken by the relevant authority. A competent authority with a macroprudential 
oversight function would be particularly well-suited to this task given its mandate to 
identify and monitor sources of systemic risk across institutions, markets and market 
infrastructure.
First, identify the most important channels of (direct and indirect) contagion, 
which may manifest themselves alone or in combination. Identifying 
contagion channels would help policymakers to focus their attention on the 
potential “weak spots” and “reinforcing mechanisms” in the financial system 
that could lead to direct and, in particular, indirect contagion.
Second, gather data and information on various forms of interconnectedness 
(direct and indirect links), including various forms of institutions, market 
segments and market infrastructures. In order for policymakers to have an 
information advantage, there would need to be broad-based, regular and 
systematic data collection. Beyond understanding direct links through 
exposures, it would be essential to explore and uncover possible indirect 
links, for example through exposure concentrations, correlated exposures or 
various mechanisms that could magnify the market price channel.34
Third, create a framework for the comprehensive monitoring of systemic risk. 
Combining the evolution of interconnectedness with the level of financial 
stress, and taking into account potential channels of contagion, would 
facilitate the effective monitoring of systemic risk.
Based on the above steps, policymakers would have an information advantage 
relative to markets that could be used to mitigate information asymmetries, and 
potentially to prevent episodes of systemic financial stress, in line with the objectives 
of macroprudential authorities. Steps 1 to 3 are also necessary conditions for 
effective application of the macroprudential measures under parts A and B of this 
section. Effective policy action requires robust informational and analytical support.
34 Competent authorities could also consider whether they have enough policy tools available to limit the formation of 
“excessive” interconnectedness (e.g. through exposure limits). 
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Concluding remarks
This paper explores a framework for identifying and managing indirect contagion. 
Indirect contagion is the spreading of financial shocks through channels other than 
the direct contractual relations of financial actors. Indirect contagion almost defines 
systemic risk – a mechanism through which market failures spread far and wide 
across the global financial system. A proper understanding of indirect contagion is 
therefore essential to effective systemic risk management.
The paper has identified two classes of mechanisms that are present in indirect 
contagion: a price channel and an information channel. Prices transmit shocks to 
otherwise unrelated parties in the financial system when they hold correlated
securities. Information – or a lack of accurate information – leads to defensive 
behaviour by market participants, which amplifies the impact of negative shocks.
The first important observation is that, since indirect contagion is the spreading of 
market failures through the financial system, existing reforms aimed at making both 
individual actors and the system as a whole stronger will also contribute to
containing indirect contagion.
In addition, the paper discusses three possible policy innovations which could help 
authorities to effectively and efficiently contain indirect contagion: the macro-
prudential use of time-varying and cross-sectional liquidity regulation; restrictions on
margins and haircuts; and principles of the effective use of authorities’ informational 
advantage.
The financial crisis has instigated important regulatory reforms designed to make 
the global financial system more robust. These reforms are being implemented; it 
will take some time before a comprehensive evaluation of their effects will be 
possible. The process of developing tools for authorities to enable them to predict, 
understand, and manage financial crises is well underway, and this paper explores
a possible framework for dealing with one of the most challenging aspects of crises.
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